Masthead and Recent Cases by unknown
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 16 
Issue 4 November 1951 Article 2 
1951 
Masthead and Recent Cases 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Masthead and Recent Cases, 16 MO. L. REV. (1951) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss4/2 
This Masthead is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Published in January, April, June, and November by the
School of Law, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.
Volume XVI NOVEMBER, 1951 Number 4
If a subscriber wishes his subscription to the Review discontinued at Its
expiration, notice to that effect should be sent; otherwise it is assumed that a
continuation is desired.
Subscription Price $2.50 per volume 85 cents per current number
EDITORIAL BOARD
























ESTHER MASON, Business Manager
Publication of signed contributions does not signify adoption of the views
expressed by the REVIEW or its Editors collectively.
"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questlons and
great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass
by because they did not deal with the Constitution or a telephone company, yet
which have in them the germ of some wider theory, and therefore of some pro-
found interstitial change in the very tissue of the laW."-OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
COLLECTE LEGAL PAPERS (1920) 269.
Recent Cases
AGENCY-ScOPE OF PERMISSION UNDER THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE-
VIOLATION OF RULES
New York Casualty Co. v. Lewellenl
The plaintiff insurance company issued a policy of automobile liability insut-
ance to one Sutton, a Missouri resident, as the named insured. The policy by
reference incorporated the Missouri Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, which pro-
vides that all policies of automobile liability insurance issued pursuant thereto shall
1. 184 F. 2d 891 (8th Cir. 1950).
(458)
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"insure the person named therein and any other person using or responsible for the
use of said motor vehicle ...with the express or implied permission of the said
insured." This clause is commonly referred to as the "omnibus clause." Sutton
was a construction contractor. Lewellen, his general foreman, had permission to use
Sutton's truck during working hours, to drive it to and from work and to stop on
the way to attend to personal business. Sutton instructed the employees to park
the truck and call him if they took a drink while driving. In violation of this in-
struction, Lewellen, while en route home from work, stopped at a bar, drank some
beer, and then continued driving to a point where he became involved in a collision.
Plaintiff insurance company brought this action for a declaratory judgment in the
federal court to determine whether Lewellen was an additional assured within the
terms of the policy issued to Sutton. Plaintiff's contention was that Lewellen had
violated an express instruction not to drive while drinking and therefore had no
permission to drive the truck at the time of the accident and was not within the
coverage of the "omnibus clause." The United States Court of Appeals, relying
upon a Missouri case,3 affirmed a decision of the district court that the violation of
the no-drinking rule was not sufficient to terminate automatically Sutton's permis-
sion to use the truck.
The purpose of the omnibus clause is to create additional assureds from those
who are driving a vehicle with the express or implied permission of the named
assured.4 An employee may be given permission to use the vehicle within the scope
of the employer's business, or to use it for the employee's own personal benefit or
to use it for both of these purposes. It would seem that Lewellen's permission was of
the last type, i.e. permission to use the vehicle both for the employer's business and
for Lewellen's personal benefit. Obviously, the use of the truck during working
hours would be within the scope of Lewellen's employment but one might well
question whether the use of the truck to go to and from work was within the scope
of employment.5 When permission is given to use the vehicle outside the scope of
employment, the relationship of employer-employee ceases and a bailor-bailee rela-
tionship begins. A collateral issue, when a commercial vehicle is involved, arises in
policies containing a provision which limits coverage to commercial uses. Under
such a provision, it is questionable whether permission to use the vehicle for personal
uses will extend the coverage of the policy to the bailee.6 Apparently no provision of
this type was in the policy involved in the principal case. It is conceded that Lew-
ellen had permission to use the truck in the first instance. The question is how much
deviation from such permitted use is necessary to terminate this initial permission.
2. Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.210 (1949).
3. Rainwater v. Wallace, 169 S.W. 2d 450, 456 (Mo. App. 1943); aff'd, 351
Mo. 1044, 174 S.W. 2d 835, 838 (1943); 5 A.L.R. 2d 641 (1949).
4. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 104 F. 2d 477 (4th Cir. 1939);
Nyman v. M-I Garage Co., 211 La. 375, 30 So. 2d 123, 12$ (1947); 45 C.J.S. § 829,
p. 894.
5. See Smith v. Fine, 351 Mo. 1179, 175 S.W. 2d 761 (1944); but cf. O'Hare
v. Flint Cleaning Co., 170 S.W. 2d (Mo. App. 1943).
6. Gray v. Sawatzki, 291 Mich. 491, 289 N.W. 227 (1939).
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The courts are not agreed on the extent of deviation permitted. Some courts apply
a narrow rule saying that permission to use the vehicle for one purpose does not
imply permission to use it for every purpose.7 Under this rule, permission must
have been given for the particular use being made of the vehicle at the time it was
involved in the accident. If the permission is limited to use within the scope of em-
ployment, the scope of permission is co-extensive with the scope of employment and
it does not include permission to use for other purposes. A more liberal rule, ap-
plied by other courts, requires only that permission be given in the first instance,,
Under this rule, a substantial deviation from the permitted use will not preclude
the employee from being an additional assured within the terms of the omnibus
clause. If the employee's permission is to use the vehicle only within the scope of
employment, he may nevertheless be an additional assured even though his devia-
tion has been so great that it would absolve his employer from tort liability for his
conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Under a third rule, the minor deviation rule, minor deviations from the per-
mitted use are not considered as terminating the original permission. 9 This rule
seems to be the one followed in Missouri, where the permission in the first instance
is limited to use within the scope of employment. In Rainwater v. Wallace,1" cited
in the principal case, the employee of a tree surgeon used his employer's truck in
connection with the inspection of trees in the yard of a real estate agent. The in-
spection was within the scope of his employment but the employee also intended to
obtain a list of houses from the real estate agent for his own personal purposes. An
accident occurred while the employee was on a street leading to both places, the
office and the house of the real estate agent being but two blocks apart. The court
in Rainwater v. Wallace said, "It is the well established rule in this state, that a
servant does not step without the scope of his employment, as a matter of law, by
joining some private business of his own with that of his master's, except where he
makes a marked deviation from his employer's business." Thus, in the Rainwater
case, the court seemed to imply that scope of employment has an important bearing
on the scope of permission under the omnibus clause where the permission was
given to use the vehicle incident to the employment.
The significance of the statutory requirement that an omnibus clause be in-
cluded in the liability policy has not been decided by the Missouri Courts. The
cases relied on in Rainwater v. Wallace involved the master's liability for his serv-
ants torts and did not involve the scope of permission under the omnibus clause.
However, the Missouri cases indicate that a minor deviation would not remove the
employee from the scope of employment so as to free the employer from tort lia-
7. Johnson v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 131 Me. 288, 161 At. 496 (1932);
Laroche v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 325 Pa. 478, 7 A. 2d. 361 (1939).
8. Dickinson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 101 Conn. 369, 125 At. 866 (1924);
see dissent: Stowall v. New York Indem. Co., 157 Tenn. 301, 8 S.W. 2d 473 (1928).
9. However, courts applying the narrow rule might permit slight deviations.
See Laroche v. Farm Bureau Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., supra, n. 7.
10. Supra. n. 3.
[Vol. 16
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bility. A frequently cited case on this point is Gutkrie v. Holmes."1 In that case,
a chauffeur was to drive the car back to the defendant's home after making an er-
rand. Instead the chauffeur went on a five hour drinking spree and became involved
in an accident. The court said, "By what we have written above, we do not mean
to say that slight deviations from a direct route to the defendant's garage would
exonerate the master from the negligence of the servant... ." Guttwie v. Holmes is
cited in a later case, Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Kansas City Rys.1, 2 which held that
the fact that a chauffeur returning to defendant's garage intended to stop for dinner
was not sufficient deviation to exonerate the employer. In Slottower v. Clark,3
the chauffeur had instructions to pick up defendant's son. The chauffeur went in
another direction on his own business and on return had an accident. The court
said that mere orders do not absolve the master from liability. In the above cases,
the scope of permission was limited to the scope of employment. It is submitted
that the same rule should be applied when the permission is for a purpose other
than within the scope of employment. Minor deviations from the permitted use
should not prevent the permittee being an additional assured under the omnibus
clause. In the principal case, the employee was violating to some extent an express
instruction. However, in light of the Missouri decisions above quoted, it would
seem that the federal court was correct in saying that such violation is not sufficient
to terminate automatically the employer's express permission for the actual use of
the vehicle at the time an accident occurs.
MONTGOMERY WILSON
PROPERTY-ADvERSE POSSESSION UNDER UNRECORDED DEED
King v. Fascing'
Shaw v. Armstrong2
In King v. Fasching, Barrow purchased the property in question at a sheriff's
sale by deed dated March 5, 1935, recorded March 23, 1935. Barrow conveyed to
Robert and Dorothy King by quit-claim deed on April 8, 1935. The Kings also
obtained a warranty deed dated April 9, 1935 from the prior owner against whom
the sheriff's sale was held. The Kings did not promptly record their deeds, but went
into immediate possession and remained in possession continuously from the date of
the conveyance from Barrow until this suit to quiet title was started by plaintiff,
Dorothy King, against defendants. The Kings made major improvements on the
property and paid all taxes up to and including those for 1947 except the 1946 city
taxes. Robert King, plaintiff's husband, died August 26, 1948. When plaintiff
11. 272 Mo. 215, 198 S.W. 854, 859 (1917).
12. 207 Mo. App. 137, 231 S.W. 277, 278 (1921); see also Hubbard v. Lock-
joint Pipe Co., 70 F. Supp. 589, 593 (E.D. Mo. 1947); Schulte v. Grand Union Tea
Coffee Co., 43 S.W. 2d 832 (Mo. App. 1931); Gerry v. Boehmer Coal Co., 241 S.W.
976 (Mo. App. 1922).
13. 191 Mo. App. 102, 179 S.W. 55 (1915).
1. 234 S.W. 2d 549 (Mo. 1950).
2. 235 S.W. 2d 851 (Mo. 1951), infra note 9.
1951]
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returned from work one evening in November 1948, she found a note from de-
fendants to come to see them. When she did so, she was informed by Mrs. Fasching
that defendants had purchased the property at a sale for delinquent 1946 city taxes.
The report of the case does not show the date of defendants' deed from the tax
sale nor the date of its recordation. Defendants had also obtained a quit-claim
deed from Barrow, plaintiff's grantor, dated December 7, 1948, which recited (as
shown by transcript) ten dollars consideration, and recorded December 8, 1948.
The defendants contended that their purchase of the property at the tax sale cut
off any interest which the plaintiff had under the unrecorded deeds, leaving plain-
tiff with no interest in the property sufficient to permit her to contest the de-
fendant's tax title on the basis of grossly inadequate consideration. The court held
that plaintiff had perfected her title by adverse possession for more than ten years,
and that such title was sufficient upon which to base an action challenging defend-
ants tax title.
This decision raises the question whether a party receiving title under a valid
and recordable deed and who fails to record that deed, must claim under such title,
or whether in the alternative he can claim under an original title perfected by
adverse possession. Adverse possession implies possession which is adverse to an
interest of another party. But in the principal case, plaintiff was the only person
who held an interest in the property prior to the purchase by defendants at the
tax sale. Even though plaintiff's deed was not recorded, it was good as against
her grantor.3 Defendants' interest in the property did not accrue until their pur-
chase at the tax sale, less than one year prior to the suit to quiet title. Therefore,
prior to the tax sale no one other than plaintiff had an interest in the property.
But if the problem is approached from the viewpoint of the title of plaintiff
being defective, the result reached by the court in the principal case appears more
logical. Under our system of recording, an unrecorded deed in a chain of title
creates a gap in the record which may not become apparent for many years. Since
the very purpose of the recording statutes is to provide a system by which the
state of title to realty can be determined by a check of the record alone, it is
not unreasonable that an unrecorded deed be considered to create a defect in title.
In addition, the failure to record a deed gives rise to circumstances which render
it possible for a subsequent purchaser from the record owner, without actual notice
of the prior unrecorded deed, to take free of such unrecorded deed. The recordation
being a part of the conveyance, at least as to third parties, it can be said that full
title has not passed until the deed is recorded. In Glass v. Lynchburg Shoe Co.,4
Borland conveyed to Wray, but Wray failed to record his deed. Shortly thereafter,
Wray executed a deed to Glass dated July 27, 1912. Glass recorded his deed, took
possession and was in actual possession from the date of the conveyance to him
3. Mo. REv. STAT. § 442.400 (1949), Mo. REv. STAT. ANN., § 3428---"No such
instrument in writing shall be valid, except between the parties thereto, and such
as have actual notice thereof, until the same shall be deposited with the recorder
for record."
4. 212 N. C. 70, 192 S.E. 899 (1937).
[Vol. 16
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until the time when defendant obtained a judgment against Borland, November 16,
1925. In 1935, defendant levied on the property held by Glass in execution of the
judgment against Borland. Plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the sale of the property
under the levy. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the unrecorded
deed did not convey complete title to the property under the recording acts of
North Carolina,5 therefore the conveyance to Wray was defective. But the court
further held that Glass had perfected his title by adverse possession beyond the
statutory period. It will be noted that in this case, the period of time during which
Wray held title could not be regarded as part of the required period of adverse
possession since his deed was not recorded. North Carolina requires the person
claiming title by adverse possession to have been in possession under color of title,
and for an instrument to be color of title, it must be recorded. Missouri does not
require color of title," therefore following the theory of the Glass case, the adverse
holder could perfect his title being in possession under an unrecorded instrument.
In Nowlin v. ReynoldsT Nowlin conveyed to defendant in 1845 or 1846. Defend-
ant took possession, but did not record his deed, and it was lost. In 1846, subse-
quent to the conveyance to defendant, Nowlin conveyed the same property to
Staples in trust to secure a debt. Plaintiff claimed under a trustee's deed from
Penn, successor trustee, dated 1869. The court held that defendant's possession
was adverse to Knowlin and did not cease to be adverse after the mortgage deed
was executed by Nowlin to Staples. Therefore, defendant perfected his title by
adverse possession for the statutory period.8
As far as any authority has been relied upon in the cases holding as did the
King case, it is those cases involving a completed sale where the purchaser takes
possession but no deed is delivered.9 The courts, in those cases, are uniform in
their decisions that the grantee holds adversely to the grantor and under such
circumstances perfects his title by so holding for the statutory period. But it
should be remembered that in those cases the grantee never received a good deed
which could be recorded.
In Shaw v. Arnstrong,'0 the Missouri Supreme Court again followed the King
case. In the Shaw case, defendant received a warranty deed in 1930, took and
maintained possession until 1948, but did not record his deed. In 1943, the land
was bid in at a tax sale by a trustee for the county, but no deed was given under
5. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 47-18 (1943)---"No conveyance of land, or contract
to convey, or lease of land for more than three years shall be valid to pass any
property, as against creditors or purchasers for -a valuable consideration, from the
donor, bargainor, or lessor, but from the registration thereof within the county
where the land lies. . ....
6. Quick v. Rufe, 164 Mo. 408, 64 S.W. 102 (1901); Wilkerson v. Eilers, 114
Mo. 245, 21 S.W. 514 (1893); Mather v. Walsh, 107 Mo. 121, 17 S.W. 755 (1891).
7. 25 Grat. (66 Va.) 137 (1874).
8. See in accord: Grinuk v. Chapin National Bank, 265 Mass. 30, 163 N.E.
559 (1928).
9. Adams v. Wright, 353 Mo. 1226, 187 S.W. 2d 216 (1945); Ridgeway v.
Holliday, 59 Mo. 444 (1875).
10. 235 S.W. 2d 851 (Mo. 1951).
RECENT CASES1951]
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the sale until 1948 when a deed was given to the successor trustee for the county
who conveyed to plaintiffs. In holding that defendant has sufficient interest in
the land to contest the tax deed, the court said: "Thus the evidence shows de-
fendant was in possession of the described land, under a claim of ownership prior
to the accrual of a lien for state and county taxes and the alleged foreclosure of
the lien by the tax sale under which plaintiffs claim. Under the facts defendant
had such possession as to enable him to perfect his title by adverse possession for
more than ten years."
Cases found in which the question was in issue have generally held as did the
King case, but none of them discuss the theory upon which the decision is based.
Probably the theory is that an unrecorded deed is a defect in title and may be
corrected by adverse possession even though there is no one who can bring an
action against the adverse holder until such time as the record owner makes a
subsequent conveyance to a third party.
What appeared to trouble the court in the King case was finding sufficient
interest in plaintiff upon which she could base her attack upon defendants' tax
deed. This could have been found by a showing that defendants had actual notice
of plaintiff's interest in the property.1 ' It was early held in Vance v. Corrigan,"
that a purchaser at a tax sale is in the same position in respect to a prior unrecorded
deed as a subsequent purchaser from the record owner. Therefore, the purchaser
at a tax sale takes good title as against the holder of an unrecorded deed of which
the former had no actual notice.13
It is not clear from the record of the King case whether or not defendants
had actual notice of plaintiff's possession. Defendants indicated that they did not
have. But plaintiff testified that her husband told her that Mr. Fasching had been
given the money to pay the 1946 city taxes. Also the plaintiff was told by Mrs.
Fasching that the defendants had purchased "her property for 1946 taxes." This
is some indication that the parties knew one another and that the defendants knew
that plaintiff was in possession of the property which under Missouri law is suffi-
cient basis for a finding that defendants had actual notice of plaintiff's unrecorded
deed.' 4 Whatever were the facts in this regard, the question was not discussed by
the court. Neither does the report of the case show in whose name the property
was assessed for taxes or what persons were made parties to the tax suit. If the
plaintiff was a party to the tax suit, then certainly defendants must have been
aware that plaintiff had some interest in the property. It was argued by counsel,
and the court held, that the plaintiff's adverse possession for more than ten years
gave her good title which was sufficient for her to contest defendants' tax deed.
But even if we may assume that defendants did not have actual notice of
plaintiff's unrecorded deed, it still is possible that plaintiff's unrecorded deed along
11. Stuart v. Ramsey, 196 Mo. 404, 95 S.W. 382 (1906).
12. 78 Mo. 94 (1883).
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with her possession, even though unknown to defendants, was sufficient to base
an attack upon defendants' tax deed on the basis of inadequate consideration. It
is logical that for a subsequent purchaser without actual notice of the prior un-
recorded deed to take free of that deed, he must be a bona fide purchaser, and it
would seem that one who pays a grossly inadequate consideration for a tax deed to
property is not such a bona fide purchaser. That is the very basis upon which the
courts set aside tax deeds where the consideration is grossly inadequate.
In Davis v. Johnson,"5 plaintiff sold the land to Lynn who gave a note and
mortgage on the land to Martin for the purchase money. Martin sold the note
and mortgage to Prowell and plaintiff was required to endorse the note. Lynn
gave up the land and plaintiff took possession. Plaintiff's only interest in the land
was his possession which he claimed to have taken to protect himself on his en-
dorsement. Although plaintiff had been in possession twelve or fifteen years at the
time of the tax sale, he made no claim to title by adverse possession, but relie4
on his mere possession alone, as a basis for contesting the tax deed. The court
held that plaintiff's possession with his endorsement on the note gave him sufficient
interest in the property because of his subrogation rights upon which to base an
attack on a tax deed which was given for a grossly inadequate consideration. The
court did not state whether defendant knew of plaintiff's possession nor whether
it was necessary for him to have known of the possession. It would be somewhat
illogical to say that possession merely for the protection of subrogation rights
under an endorsement on a note is sufficient interest to contest a tax deed and yet
hold that possession under an unrecorded deed is insufficient.
Whether an unrecorded deed alone without possession would give the holder
thereof sufficient interest to contest a tax deed in Missouri, is not certain. Again
it would seem logical that it should be sufficient since the purchaser at the tax sale
must be a bona fide purchaser in order to cut off the interest under the unrecorded
deed. But in Scott v. Unknown Heirs of Garrison,16 the defendant claimed under
an unrecorded deed, but had never been in possession of the property and had never
paid any of the taxes. Plaintiff purchased at a tax sale without actual notice of
defendant's interest. The court held that the defendant did not have sufficient
interest in the property to contest plaintiff's tax deed on the basis of grossly in-
adequate consideration. No deed was introduced into evidence, and the only
evidence of defendant's interest shown in the report of the case was defendant's
own testimony that he had received a deed to the property but had not recorded
it. The case is not clear whether the decision was based upon defendant's failure
to prove that he had ever received a deed, or whether it was necessary to contest
a tax deed. McDowell, Judge, said: "Certainly the evidence shows that defendant
had no record title. It also is undisputed that he never had possession of the prop-
erty under claim of ownership so as to give him a right by adverse possession.
He paid no taxes thereon nor made any improvements. The only evidence he has,
15. 357 Mo. 417, 208 S.W. 2d 266 (1948).
16. 235 S.W. 2d 372 (Mo. 1951).
1951] RECENT CASES
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showing an interest in this property, is that he claims it was conveyed to him by
a deed many years ago, which he never recorded. The evidence is wholly insufficient
on the part of defendant to show a.claim or interest in the land in question so as
to give him a right to challenge the sufficiency of the [tax) deed."
Another factor in the Scott case which may have influenced the court in its
decision was defendant's refusal to tender payment for improvements which plain-
tiff had made on the property.
The King case and the Shaw case possibly give rise to an exception to the rule
in Missouri that possession is evidence only of actual notice of the unrecorded
deed on the part of the subsequent purchaser from the record owner. It was
held in Hendrix v. GalloWay,'7 that the registry acts do not protect a purchaser
from the record owner as against a title acquired by adverse possession. It was held
in Ridgeway v. Holliday,' that an innocent purchaser by deed without general
warranties did not take title superior to a title acquired by adverse possession
because the absence of general warranties was sufficient to put the purchaser on
inquiry. Since the statutes made no provision for recordation of a title acquired
by adverse possession, rights as between the adverse title holder and a subse-
quent purchaser from the record owner would be governed by common law, and
the purchaser would take only such title as his vendor had. Therefore after the
holder of an unrecorded deed has perfected his title by adverse possession, his
title would be good as against a subsequent purchaser from the record owner, even
though the subsequent purchaser had no knowledge whatever of circumstances
which would put him on inquiry. No cases have been found of such a rule being
applied where the subsequent purchaser took by general warranty deed, but the
cases hold that title acquired by adverse possession is as good in every respect
as if the holder thereof had perfect record title.19 Under such a theory, once the
title has been acquired by adverse possession, the adverse title holder would not
even have to maintain his possession in order to have title superior to that acquired
by subsequent purchaser from the record owner. It was so held in the Ridgeway
case where the subsequent purchaser took by deed without general warranties.
In view of this theory perhaps it might be desirable to have some system for getting
title acquired by adverse possession on the records. But here again a problem
would arise in view of the fact that often the adverse title holder does not know
that there is a defect in his record title until it is questioned in court.
BRucE A. RING'
17. 211 Mo. 536, 111 S.W. 60 (1908).
18. 54 Mo. 444 (1875).
19. Ridgeway v. Holliday, s-pura note 8; Biddle v. Mellon, 13 Mo. 355 (1950).
*Attorney with Missouri State Highway Department and former student editor
of the Review. A.B., 1949, LL.B., June 1951, University of Missouri.
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